This blog is part of the series ‘The RFT Glossary‘. RFT stands for Relational Frame Theory. It’s a remarkable theory about the interplay between language and our behaviour. RFT can be somewhat challenging for newcomers to grasp. It includes many terms that almost seem like a foreign language. That’s why these blogs exist – as a sort of glossary for RFT. The bolded words in the text can be found in the glossary.

In the previous blogs, we’ve seen that truth and evidence are contingent upon how you perceive life: your world view. We’ve asserted that you cannot view life without a world view. A general world view is also referred to as a world hypothesis by the philosopher of science, Pepper (1942). Some world hypotheses are conducive to science, while others are not. In the previous blog, we examined the two world hypotheses that are unsuitable for science. This week, we scrutinize the first world hypothesis that is indeed suitable for science: formism.

Formism

In the world hypothesis known as formism, the central idea is that everything we experience consists of various forms. Each form is unique, yet they share similarities and differences with one another. For instance, every tree is unique, but each tree shares certain characteristics with other trees. These shared attributes define a tree (such as a trunk, bark, and leaves or needles). Let’s delve deeper into formism with some examples.

Unique forms and their attributes

Consider this yellow teddy bear above. This bear can be seen as a unique form. We can state that this unique form possesses the following attributes: ‘resembles a bear’ and ‘yellow’. Schematically, it appears as follows:

Let’s add a few other unique forms to our unique yellow teddy bear, namely: a blue teddy bear and a yellow sheet of paper. Now we have three unique forms: a yellow teddy bear, a blue teddy bear, and a yellow sheet of paper. The blue teddy bear and the yellow teddy bear share the attribute ‘resembles a bear’. The yellow teddy bear and the yellow sheet of paper share the attribute ‘yellow’.

Each category can also have subcategories. For instance, every tree can be divided into a type of tree (e.g., oak tree, maple tree, etc.). Each type of tree shares specific attributes with other trees of its kind. These specific attributes are not found in other types of trees. For example, an oak tree has a certain leaf shape that other types of trees don’t possess. This allows an oak tree to be distinguished from other trees, such as a maple tree.

In summary, attributes are integral to unique forms. You can establish categories based on attributes. Unique forms can be part of a category due to shared attributes inherent to that category. This approach enables us to differentiate between various unique forms.

Truth

As discussed earlier, each world hypothesis has a criterion for truth. In the case of formism, something is deemed true based on correspondence. Something belongs to a specific category when the attributes of the unique forms correspond with those of the category.

Formism in psychology

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the book in which disorders are categorized (APA, 2022), is quintessentially a formistic approach to psychology. Within the DSM, symptoms of behavioural disorders are classified. The DSM emerged from a need for consensus. Prior to the introduction of the DSM, there was a maze of different names for certain behaviours. No one knew precisely what was meant by terms like ‘depression,’ and each individual had their own interpretation. Hence, a need for consensus arose, leading to categorization based on discernible outward symptoms. In this manner, the creation of the DSM was rooted in formism, perhaps even unconsciously.

Specifically, we can observe formism within the DSM in the categorization of behaviour based on attributes, also referred to as symptoms. Furthermore, it’s evident in the notion that these outward symptoms (attributes) convey something valuable about the unique behaviour (unique form). Formism is also apparent in the criterion for truth. According to the DSM, it’s considered true that someone has depression when their behaviour aligns with the outward symptoms (attributes) associated with the ‘depression’ category.

Unlike the DSM, formism isn’t widely prevalent in psychology. It’s relatively limited in its approach, particularly when dealing with more complex processes that influence behaviour.

Next week, we’ll delve into organicism, which takes a cyclical approach.

References
American Psychiatric Association. (2022). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed., text rev.). https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425787
Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses: A study in evidence (Vol. 31). Univ of California Press.

This blog is part of the “RFT Dictionary” series. RFT stands for Relational Frame Theory, an incredible theory that explores the relationship between language and behaviour. RFT can be challenging for newcomers to grasp, as it incorporates numerous terms that may seem like a foreign language. That’s why these blogs exist—to serve as a sort of dictionary for RFT. The bolded words in the text can be found in the dictionary, providing definitions and explanations to enhance your understanding.

In previous blog posts, we have seen that what you consider as true is, among other things, dependent on your world view (the lens through which you view the world), also known as a world hypothesis. In the last blog post, we explored the criteria a world hypothesis must meet in order to be suitable for science. A world hypothesis is deemed suitable if it allows for the confirmation or refutation of a claim made by someone. This confirmation or refutation should be possible through measurements and logic. I would like to illustrate this by discussing two world hypotheses in which this principle is lacking and thus are unsuitable for science: Animism and Mysticism.

Animism

Animism is the belief that a spirit, deity, or divinity is responsible for certain phenomena. For example, it suggests that Thor, the god of thunder, is responsible for causing thunderstorms. There are many variations of animism, ranging from the belief that every tree and river has its own god or spirit, to the notion that there is a single god who determines everything. And there are many other variations in between. All these variations assume the existence of a divinity, which explains why the world is the way it is. This divinity is not directly observable, and this, in itself, is not a problem for science. There are scientific disciplines that rely on indirect measurements or phenomena that are not directly perceptible. Occasionally, such matters are labelled as pseudoscience, but generally, it is not a limitation to approach the indirectly observable aspects scientifically. So, that the divinity can only be indirectly observed is not the entire reason why animism is not suitable for science. To understand what does make it problematic, we need to consider the following.

In most cultures, certain individuals (such as priests, imams, nuns, etc.) have more direct contact with the divinity or divinities than others (the common people). For simplicity, let’s refer to all these individuals who have contact with the divinity as “priests.” These priests can inform the common people about the motives of the divinity. Thus, the divinity is not directly observable except by the priests. Therefore, the truth can only be traced back to what these priests say. Their claims cannot be confirmed or refuted by others because they hold exclusive access to the divinity. Consequently, all truth is mediated through them. Essentially, we can only rely on the stories told by those who have contact with the divinity, i.e., the priests. The truth they convey is impossible to refute or confirm. It is this combination that poses a problem for science: the divinity is not directly observable except by a select group, who must be believed on their word. The notion that something is true because someone says so is referred to as dogmatism. Animism often leads to dogmatic situations. The fact that a priest’s dogmatic claim cannot be refuted renders animism unsuitable for science.

Mysticism

The mystical experience forms the foundation of mysticism. The mystical experience is often described as a state in which one feels a sense of unity with all there is. This feeling is so powerful that it is perceived as the truth. There is no other truth beyond this. This intense feeling is also referred to as intuition or Love. Intuition or the feeling of Love becomes the criterion for truth: something is true if your intuition or feeling indicates that it is true. Your feeling becomes your truth. Truth, in this context, is limited to the individual and cannot be refuted or confirmed by others. Therefore, it is not suitable for science.

 We cannot claim that mysticism itself is not true; it can be a valid way to approach life, just like animism. However, mysticism is not suitable for science because it cannot be refuted or confirmed by others. It holds a highly personal perspective on truth.

A little side note: Mysticism can transition into animism and dogmatism when an individual’s mystical experience becomes a teaching or a belief system.

Animism and mysticism not better than science

Animism and mysticism are neither fundamentally more nor less true than world hypotheses that are suitable for science. Both are valid ways to navigate life with, if one prefers to do so. The reason they are not suitable for science is that the truth is not shareable with others: you cannot refute or confirm someone’s claim. In the case of animism, the truth lies in the hands of a select group (the priests), and in the case of mysticism, the truth is within the individual’s grasp only (one’s own intuition). Perhaps science may arrive at similar conclusions as certain mystical or animistic traditions. That is entirely possible, but the approach to those conclusions comes from a different perspective—a perspective that allows for the possibility of confirming or refuting claims. Alternatively, there might emerge a world hypothesis that can bridge mysticism and/or animism with science. Pepper’s world hypotheses are not fixed, so new possibilities may unfold. If that happens, there must be room to refute and/or confirm claims made by others, based on a truth accessible to everyone.

Next week, we will explore Pepper’s first world hypothesis which is suitable for science: “formism”

References
Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses: A study in evidence (Vol. 31). Univ of California Press.

This blog is part of the “RFT Dictionary” series. RFT stands for Relational Frame Theory, an incredible theory that explores the relationship between language and behavior. RFT can be challenging for newcomers to grasp, as it incorporates numerous terms that may seem like a foreign language. That’s why these blogs exist—to serve as a sort of dictionary for RFT. The bolded words in the text can be found in the dictionary, providing definitions and explanations to enhance your understanding.

In the previous blog, we saw that truth and evidence depend on how you view life: your philosophy or worldview. We have established that you cannot look at life without a worldview. It’s like a pair of glasses that you can’t take off but can exchange for another pair. Even scientists wear such glasses and have a worldview. Philosopher of science, Pepper (1942), distinguished between six different global worldviews, which he called world hypotheses. Each has its own perspective on truth, also known as the “truth criterion.”

Suitability for Science 

However, not every world hypothesis is suitable for science, according to Pepper. In this blog, I would like to tell you more about what a worldview or world hypothesis must meet if you want to use it as a basis for science. For science, it is necessary for me to confirm or refute someone’s claim. When I make a statement, you should be able to confirm or refute it. Pepper calls this process corroboration. Corroboration of a claim can be done in two ways:

1) Through measurements

2) Through logic

Measurements

For example, I could measure the boiling point of water using a thermometer. I say to you, the reader, “Water boils at 100 degrees Celsius.” You might not be convinced and want to conduct the measurement yourself. You do so and see that the thermometer indeed shows 100 degrees when the water boils. With your measurement, you confirm my claim. Pepper refers to this confirmation of a claim based on measurements as “corroboration of data.”

Logic

You can also confirm something based on logic. Take, for example, a chair made by a manufacturer named Poofywoof. This manufacturer, Poofywoof, is known for producing sturdy chairs. Poofywoof has a certification and undergoes regular external inspections to assess the strength of their chairs. Recently, I have purchased such a chair from Poofywoof, and I say to you, “This is a sturdy chair, go ahead and sit on it, it’s from Poofywoof!” You are still a bit skeptical and ask me, “Why is this chair sturdy? Just because it’s from Putjefrats?” I’ll respond, “Well, Putjefrats is known for producing sturdy chairs; they have a certification and undergo regular inspections.” “Oh, if that’s the case,” you say, “then it is very likely that this is a sturdy chair.” This way, you confirm my claim based on the logical coherence of various data. Pepper refers to this confirmation based on logic as “corroboration of danda.”

Within a world hypothesis, both opportunities of confirmation or refutation must be possible: both based on logic and based on data. Two of Pepper’s world hypotheses don’t meet this standard, and four do. In the next blog, we will look at the two worldviews that are unsuitable for science: Animism and Mysticism.

World hypotheses themselves cannot be corroborated

A world hypothesis cannot be refuted or confirmed as true in itself. Something is true within a particular world hypothesis or from a specific worldview. Truth does not exist independently of a world hypothesis, as mentioned in the previous blog. Trying to confirm or refute a world hypothesis is like eating your own mouth: it’s impossible. One world hypothesis cannot be more or less true than another. This also applies to world hypotheses that are not suitable for science.

In the next blog, more about Animism and Mysticism.

References
Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses: A study in evidence (Vol. 31). Univ of California Press.

This blog is part of the “RFT Dictionary” series. RFT stands for Relational Frame Theory, an incredible theory that explores the relationship between language and behavior. RFT can be challenging for newcomers to grasp, as it incorporates numerous terms that may seem like a foreign language. That’s why these blogs exist—to serve as a sort of dictionary for RFT. The bolded words in the text can be found in the dictionary, providing definitions and explanations to enhance your understanding.

Science and truth

You may often come across headlines like “Science reveals that…” or “Science proves that…” in news articles. In our society, science is generally seen as a pursuit that can uncover the truth about how our world works and how we function. We believe there is one truth that exists outside of us, waiting to be discovered. Once we know this truth, we are certain. We know what to do, which choices to make, how the world operates, what is real, and what is not.

Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is a popular concept in psychology. EBM refers to therapies for which there is evidence of effectiveness. But when do we consider something as effective? How do we establish evidence? What underlies this evidence? When is something true? To explore these questions, we turn to Pepper (1942), a philosopher of science who studied truth.

Pepper argued that what is considered evidence and truth depends on your worldview. A worldview is a perspective from which you view life, similar to wearing a pair of glasses. When you put on red-tinted glasses, you see the world as red. When you put on blue-tinted glasses, you see the world as blue.

Can’t I go on without glasses?

Now you might be thinking, “Well, then I won’t wear any glasses, and I’ll see the world as it truly is.” But that’s not possible. You cannot go trough life without a worldview, and this applies to scientists as well. A scientist is not a blank slate when they embark on their research. They don’t hatch from an egg and start asking questions and conducting investigations.

A scientist also grows up and develops within a community that provides them with a set of glasses. Perhaps they may switch glasses later on, but they will never be able to look at the world without glasses. Their glasses determine which research questions are relevant and which are not, how they design their research, which factors they consider important to include, and ultimately, what they consider as true or as evidence for their research question. In future blogs, we will explore how these worldviews also influence how we view therapy, what we expect from therapy, therapists, and research on therapy.

World Hypotheses

Pepper describes six different global worldviews, which he refers to as “world hypotheses.” According to him, they are hypotheses because they cannot be tested. They are pre-analytical assumptions, which means they are assumptions made before conducting any research or analysis. All six world hypotheses will be further discussed in future blogs.

Truth is dependent on your worldview or world hypothesis

According to Pepper, each world hypothesis has its own perspective on truth. Each world hypothesis has its own criterion for determining when something is true, he says. These criteria of each of the world hypotheses are called a “truth criterion.” Therefore, there are multiple truths (truth criteria) that are associated with a worldview or world hypothesis. What we perceive as evidence is also influenced by the world hypothesis we adhere to. We will see how this unfolds when we delve into the specific world hypotheses.

In summary, science can be practiced from different worldviews. Pepper distinguishes six global worldviews, which he refers to as world hypotheses. Each world hypothesis has its own truth or truth criterion. What you consider as evidence is therefore dependent on the lens you wear or the world hypothesis you adhere to.

Some world hypotheses are suitable for science, while others are not. I will explain this in the next blog post.

References
Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses: A study in evidence (Vol. 31). Univ of California Press.